Absolute disparity is a calculation used to analyze a claim that a jury pool did not represent a fair cross-section of the community; for instance, a jury pool that is composed of only white jurors in a community that is predominantly Black. It is calculated by subtracting the percentage of a group in the jury pool from the percentage of that group in the general population.
Adequate and independent state grounds refers to the standard used by the Supreme Court to determine if it will hear a case from a state court. The Supreme Court will hear a case from a state court only if the state court judgment is overturned on
Admiralty and Maritime powers refer to the federal government’s ability to pass laws that relate to the water systems of America. Congress is granted admiralty and maritime powers through Article 3 Section II of the Constitution.
Article III refers to Article III of the Constitution, the section of the Constitution that authorizes a federal court system.
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress under Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 with the power to “establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." The bankruptcy laws that Congress makes have to be within the scope of federal bankruptcy power.
What right do prisoners have to read secular publications and display photographs while serving their sentences? To what extent can prison officials infringe on this right to serve the prison’s legitimate policy goals?
The Long Term Segregation Unit (“LTSU”) of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was established to house “the worst of the worst” of the prison’s population. When they first enter the LTSU, inmates cannot keep newspapers, magazines, or photographs in their cells, though they have limited access to religious and legal materials. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the prison’s regulation is “rationally related to a legitimate penological interest,” and therefore constitutional under the Court’s holding in Turner v. Safley.
Does a prison policy that denies newspapers, magazines and photographs to the most difficult inmates in the prison system in an effort to promote security and good behavior violate the 1st Amendment?
The Long Term Segregation Unit (“LTSU”) in Pittsburgh’s State Correctional Institution serves as a prison within a prison, housing inmates deemed “too disruptive, violent or problematic” to reside in the general prison population. Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134, 136–137 (3rd Cir. 2005). Inmates may end up in the LTSU after unsuccessful escape attempts, assaults on guards or fellow prisoners, or incidents of sexual predation. Id.
The Brandenburg test was established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969), to determine when inflammatory speech intending to advocate illegal action can be restricted.
In the context of transportation; channels are the highways, waterways, and air traffic of the country.
See also: Instrumentalities
[Last reviewed in July of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team]
Basic Governing Principles as Noted by the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit cited three basic principles that govern the issues at hand. The first is the Oneida's right of occupancy on Indian country, which "may extend from generation to generation, and will cease only by dissolution of the tribe, or their consent to sell to the party possessed of the right of pre-emption." Oneida Indian Nation, 337 F.3d. at 152 (citing In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 771 (1866)). The second, codified in the Non-Intercourse Act, represents federal preeminence over the disposition of land in Indian country, since "Congress alone has the right to say when the [United States'] guardianship over the Indians may cease." Id. (citing United States v. Boylan, 265 F. 165, 171 (2d. Cir. 1920)). The sale or conveyance of reservation land can only be made with congressional sanction, that is, "by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000)). The third principle is federal preemption, which prohibits states from imposing property taxes upon Indian reservation land without congressional approval. Id. (citing In re New York Indians, 72 U.S. at 771).
In 1997 and 1998, the Oneidas re-purchased title to parcels of aboriginal land within Sherrill, New York, in open market transactions. Sherrill subsequently assessed property taxes, which the Oneidas ignored, asserting that the properties are contained within the Oneida Indian Reservation and therefore are considered to be "Indian Country", which is nontaxable by state municipalities. Sherrill sent the Oneidas notices of tax delinquency, held a tax sale where Sherrill repurchased the parcels, then initiated eviction proceedings. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York found in favor of the Oneidas. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court and also found that the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, 7 Stat. 550, did not require the Oneidas to abandon their lands in the state of New York in exchange for land in Kansas, and further, that a reservation continues to exist even if a tribe ceases to exist and is protected under the Non-Intercourse Act. The Supreme Court must now assess the Second Circuit Court's interpretations.
This case consists of four separate questions, which ultimately address whether properties reacquired by the Oneida Indian Nation of New York are subject to taxation by the City of Sherrill, New York and Madison County, New York.
1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by the federal government?
2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't where the alleged reservation was established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty, action or enactment?
3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's alleged New York reservation?
4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the protections of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, or Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?
1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and this Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by the federal government?
2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't where the alleged reservation was established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty, action or enactment?
3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's alleged New York reservation?
4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the protections of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, or Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?
Civil forfeiture allows the government (typically the police) to seize — and then keep or sell — any property that is allegedly involved in a crime or illegal activity. Owners need not ever be arrested or convicted of a crime for their cash, cars, or even real estate to be taken away permanently by the government.
